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NOTES
CONDITIONAL LIBERTY:
RESTRICTING PROCREATION OF
CONVICTED CHILD ABUSERS
AND DEAD BEAT DADS
"This is a practical, social, economic and moral reality."1
- Judge Marilyn L. O'Connor, Monroe County Family Court
One of the most sacred privileges and vital aspects of human exis-
tence is having a child. Fortunately, for most Americans, the Supreme
Court has protected the right to have a child for nearly a century.2 The
guarantee of liberty granted by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Proc-
ess Clause "denotes... the right of the individual.., to marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children., 3 A state cannot deprive its citi-
zens of "a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right
to have offspring.",
4
In the 1970s, the Court reinforced the conviction that the Constitu-
tion protects a fundamental right to procreate, this time manifesting
itself within the fundamental right of privacy: "If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."5
As a fundamental right, therefore, any state infringement on procrea-
6tive freedom must withstand strict scrutiny.
Marc Santora, Negligent Upstate Couple Is Told Not To Procreate, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2004, at B6.
2 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing procreation as "fundamen-
tal to the very existence and survival of the race" and a "basic liberty"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (listing fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution).
3 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
4 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
5 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
6 Strict scrutiny analysis permits a state to infringe on a fundamental right only if it ad-
vances a compelling interest that is narrowly tailored to achieve the state objective. Roe v.
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Thus, if a case regarding state infringement on an individual's
right to procreate came before the Court, the state's basis for and in-
terest in restricting the right would be crucial to a constitutional
analysis. Federal circuit courts have found restrictions on procreative
freedom of incarcerated offenders to be necessary and justifiable for
various reasons; however, the Supreme Court has not issued any es-
sential holding that is widely applicable to all cases of state infringe-
ment on an criminal's right to procreate, but has expressly limited any
ruling to the specific facts of the case.7
This Note unravels the law and policy surrounding antiprocreation
restrictions to assess the objectives states have in placing such restric-
tions on criminals, specifically probationers. Emotions that Ameri-
cans attach to the notion of family and childbearing (manifest in the
fact that it is a fundamental right) concededly triggers reservations
toward restrictions for fear of a slippery slope of regulations that
would first impact prisoners, then probationers, then the American
public. Judicially imposed limitations, however, ensure that restric-
tions remain confined to criminals, and even then only the most se-
vere cases. Thus, unconvinced that a slippery slope is an issue, this
Note argues that procreation restrictions as conditions of probation
are not only legally justifiable but a practical necessity for implement-
ing established policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following this introduction, Part II presents an overview of the
probation system and examines case law imposing antiprocreation
conditions of probation on nonsupport and child abuse offenders. Part
Ell explains why antiprocreation issues are justifiable and necessary as
a means to rehabilitate offenders and protect existing and future chil-
dren of offenders. Antiprocreation conditions are only appropriate,
however, when they can be lifted upon the occurrence of a defined
event or at a specific time. Part IV examines the tests established by
the Supreme Court for infringing on fundamental rights of probation-
ers and for infringing on the fundamental rights of criminals in prison.
This Part also examines circuit court applications of the Supreme
Court's test for infringing on the procreative freedom of incarcerated
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
7 For example, in the past, the Court deemed a statute unconstitutional that allowed a jury
to impose permanent sterilization as part of the sentence for a habitual offender of crimes such
as theft or robbery. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535. The Court has permitted a state to sterilize indi-
viduals confined to a mental institution who suffer from hereditary forms of "insanity" or "im-
becility." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The Supreme Court specifically limits its holding
in this case to mental institution patients. Id. at 208.
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offenders as a means of analogizing to state court restrictions on pro-
bationers' right to procreate.
Arguing that antiprocreation conditions of probation are justifiable
and necessary in certain circumstances when the condition is
rehabilitative and protects children, Part V proposes a test for courts
to apply if antiprocreation conditions are at issue during sentencing.
This proposed test differs from the test applied to procreation
restrictions of prisoners because of inherent differences between
probation and prison-namely, that prison officials must manage
security concerns. This test also differs from those used by state
courts when imposing other conditions of probation, primarily
because, in antiprocreation cases, those tests have failed to produce
outcomes that are predictable or consistent with the goals and
practical necessities of probation. Finally, Part VI addresses
counterarguments of enforcement and gender equality and illustrates
that these issues are not so problematic as to outweigh the
justification and necessity of antiprocreation conditions.
11. PROBATION
Judges sentence offenders to probation more frequently than any
other criminal sanction.8 The Supreme Court has defined probation as
"simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a contin-
uum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a
maximum security facility to a few hours of mandatory community
service." 9 The American Bar Association provides a working defini-
tion of probation as "a sentence not involving confinement which im-
poses conditions and retains authority in the sentencing court to mod-
ify the conditions of the sentence or to resentence the offender if he
violates the conditions."' 0 Like the Supreme Court, the American Bar
Association supports the theory that probation is not a suspension of
the execution of a sentence, but a sentence itself." l
8 Rachel Roth, "No New Babies?": Gender Inequality and Reproductive Control in the
Criminal Justice and Prison Systems, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 391,395 (2004).
9 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
10 STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION 2, 9 (Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS].
I d. Suspension of the execution of a sentence, as the phrase itself indicates, occurs when
the judge imposes a sentence but the defendant is not incarcerated. See GEORGE G. KILLINGER
ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 17-18 (1976). The distinc-
tion between probation as a sentence and probation as the suspension of the execution of a sen-
tence is legally significant in some cases. Id. It is relevant for this discussion, however, only to
understand that because probation is considered to be a legitimate sentence on its own, it does
not require the suspension of any other sentence and can have independent justifications.
2005]
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Throughout the probationary period, a probation officer supervises
the offender to ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of
the probation.' 2 If the offender fails to abide by the conditions of his
probation, he may be subject to incarceration.' 3 The offender's free-
dom from prison, therefore, depends on his adherence to the stipu-
lated conditions. 14
A. Conditions of Probation
Probation is a sentence imposed for a period of time and according
to a series of conditions.' 5 These conditions may include restrictions
on association, location, and employment, but can also require proba-
tioners to attend counseling programs or participate in activities that
promote rehabilitation.' 6 In many cases, courts retain the right to alter
these conditions as the situation merits. 17 The Supreme Court has held
that "it is always true of probationers ... that they do not enjoy 'the
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only... condi-
tional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation]
restrictions. ,18
Both federal and state legislatures allow judges to use discretion in
tailoring conditions of probation to a particular defendant.' 9 The Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines advise mandatory probation conditions
and provide examples of discretionary probation conditions that
judges may choose to impose.2 0 These discretionary conditions in-
clude requirements that the probationer support his dependents, make
restitution to the victim of the offense, maintain gainful employment
or pursue education, abstain from excessive use of alcohol, and re-
frain from possessing a firearm. 21 The list of discretionary conditions
are "examples," because judges have latitude to impose additional or
22
more creative probationary conditions.
As mentioned above, however, discretionary conditions are part of
a probationary sentence and must be reasonably related to "the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
12 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 904 (1964).
13 Id.
14 NEIL COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE §§ 1:6,2:1 (2d ed. 1999).
15 Id. § 1:1.
16 Id. § 1:23.
17 Id. (collecting cases).
I8 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471,480 (1972)).
'9 Michael George Smith, Note, The Propriety and Usefulness of Geographical Restric-
tions Imposed as Conditions of Probation, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 571,579 (1995).
- 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (2004).
21 Id. § 3563(b).
22 Id. § 3563(b)(22).
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the defendant"; the condition may deprive the probationer of liberty
only to the extent necessary to fulfill the purposes of a sentence-
rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, or incapacitation.23 If a trial
judge oversteps these restrictions on his discretion, the condition may
be overruled on appeal.24
Most states grant trial judges extraordinary deference in crafting
conditions of probation based on the specific facts of each case. In-
California, for example, though statute requires that an individual
convicted of a nonviolent drug offense receive probation with the
mandatory condition of participation in an education or community
service program the "trial court is not otherwise limited in the type of
probation conditions it may impose." 25 Similarly, Pennsylvania law
lists specific conditions that courts may impose on probationers (i.e.,
meeting family responsibilities, maintaining employment, participat-
ing in community service, or remaining within the jurisdiction of the
court), but the state allows the court freedom to impose any other
condition of probation as long as it is "reasonably related to the reha-
bilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty.,
26
B. Goals of Probation-Fulfilling Basic Theories of Punishment
It is ultimately the job of legislatures to define the goals of proba-
tion, and these goals play a key role in appellate court determinations
of whether to uphold probationary conditions. 27 There are four main
purposes of criminal sentences or theories of punishment: rehabilita-
tion, deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation. The goal of punish-
ment fulfilled by probation is primarily a function of the probationary
conditions and the possibility of incarceration.28
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines explicitly list retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation as purposes of probation.29
23 Id. § 3563(b) (noting the discretionary conditions a court may consider and referring to
§ 3553(a)(1)-(2)); id. § 3553(a)(1)-(2) (setting forth the factors).
24 Examples of conditions that appeals courts have overruled include: banishment, KILL-
INGER ET AL., supra note 11, at 72 (citing People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967)), mandating attendance at Sunday school, id. at 73 (citing Jones v. Commonwealth, 38
S.E.2d 444 (Va. 1946)), and requiring donation of blood, id. (citing Springer v. United States,
148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945)).
25 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (Deering 2004).
26 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754 (West 1998).
27 Smith, supra note 19, at 574.
28 See COHEN, supra note 14, § 1:25 ("By the use of appropriate conditions, probation can
serve such legitimate goals as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.").
29 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2004).
States, judges, and commentators commonly support the use of probation for rehabilita-
tion, although it may also implicate other purposes. COHEN, supra note 14, § 1:5. Assuming that
probation is less severe than incarceration, society may conclude that the sentence imposes
insufficient retribution on an offender, or that the judge did not view the offense as serious
20051
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Prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court analogized
probation to parole, the purpose of which is to rehabilitate-to "help
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon
as they are able."3 ° Similarly, according to the American Bar Associa-
tion,
[t]he basic idea underlying a sentence to probation is very
simple. Sentencing is in a large part concerned with avoiding
future crimes by helping the defendant learn to live produc-
tively in the community which he has offended against. Pro-
bation proceeds on the theory that the best way to pursue this
goal is to orient the criminal sanction toward the community
setting in those cases where it is compatible with the other
objectives of sentencing. a
It is a common belief that an offender is more likely to be rehabili-
tated if he remains in the company of family and community while
taking advantage of treatment centers as opposed to living in prisons
that lack such treatment facilities and where the offender may net-
work with other criminals. 32 "Banishment from society ... is not the
way to integrate someone into society.,
33
Accordingly, most states explicitly list rehabilitation as the pur-
pose of probation.a If a state defines rehabilitation as the purpose of
probation, then judges should impose conditions on probation that
further this interest and guide probationers to lead law abiding lives,
encouraging them to be responsible and productive members of soci-
ety. At the same time, however, probation conditions may not unduly
restrict the liberty of probationers.35
enough; however, if the offender's sentence involves harsh probationary conditions or includes
some incarceration, this perception may be unfounded. Id. § 1:6.
Similarly, critics of probation may believe that the sentence is not harsh enough to be spe-
cifically or generally deterrent. Id. § 1:7. Certainly the idea of probation (and the conditions that
go along with it) might deter potential offenders and one term of probation may specifically
deter further crime by that probationer, thus preventing future criminality. Id.
Probation can also serve to incapacitate an offender by imposing specific conditions such
as restricting the offender's movement or prohibiting him from carrying a weapon. Id. § 1.8.
30 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471,477 (1972)).
31 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 1.
32 See id. (arguing that the odds of successfully rehabilitating an offender are better if he
remains in the community).
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.01(3)(b) (West Supp. 2004) (granting the court au-
thority to determine what community sanctions may include, including those for rehabilitative
purposes); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754 (West 1998) (permitting courts to impose any
condition as long as it fulfills the rehabilitative purpose of probation).
35 See Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that it is unlaw-
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Although the cases involving antiprocreation conditions of
probation differ as to outcome, what they share is a general support
for the idea that in some specific situations an antiprocreation
condition might be beneficial for a defendant's rehabilitation. Thus,
the case law reveals that, in the minds of at least some judges,
antiprocreation conditions of probation may in some way assist a
defendant in becoming a more responsible, productive member of
society. The question that remains is: what factors are crucial to
determining if the situation warrants an antiprocreation condition and
makes the condition necessary and justifiable for the probationer's
rehabilitation?
C. Antiprocreation Conditions of Probation: The Case Law
The many common forms of contraception available to both men
and women today allow judges to impose antiprocreation conditions
on probationers with some hope that the offender will follow the or-
der. The precise frequency with which judges have imposed these
conditions remains unclear as the orders are typically unpublished.36
The press, however, has reported cases in nearly half of the states.37 It
is unlikely that most defendants have representation during probation
hearings, and evidence suggests that defendants rarely appeal.39
American Law Reports cites only eleven instances of antiprocreation
condition appeals. 4°
The following sections explore two offenses for which sentencing
judges have imposed antiprocreation conditions of probation: non-
support and child abuse. Analysis of case law reveals that most appel-
late courts are concerned with (a) the rehabilitative nature of the con-
ful to prohibit defendant abusive mother from getting married or pregnant because those restric-
tions were not reasonably related to rehabilitation and therefore unduly restrictive on the liberty
of the probationer).
36 Roth, supra note 8, at 405-06.
37 Id. at 406 (finding that antiprocreation conditions have been reported by the media in
Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
38 See, e.g., Santora, supra note 1, at B6 (describing a drug abusing couple whose four
children were removed from their care almost immediately after birth and whom the court in-
structed, as a condition of their probation, to refrain from having another child until they could
prove that they could care for their existing children after regaining their custody). In this case,
the mother waived her right to an attorney and neither she nor her husband showed up for the
probation hearing. Id.
39 See Roth, supra note 8, at 405-06 (pointing out that, though it is not known how many
antiprocreation orders courts have imposed, very few have ever been appealed).
40 Id. at 405 (citing John C. Williams, Propriety of Conditioning Probation on Defendant's
Remaining Childless or Having No Additional Children During Probationary Period, 94 A.L.R.
3d 1218 (2004)).
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dition, (b) public protection in the form of caring for extant and future
children of the defendant, and (c) the inclusion of a time limit on the
procreation restriction.
1. Nonsupportive Parents
This Section reviews cases in which trial courts have imposed
antiprocreation conditions of probation on parents (primarily fathers)
who have failed to pay child support (so-called deadbeat dads) and
explores how appellate courts have dealt with the reasonableness of
the condition, including whether it is narrowly tailored or overly
broad in fulfilling the state's interest in rehabilitating offenders during
probation.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court faced the question of whether a
court may restrict an offender's right to procreate as a condition of
probation in State v. Oakley.4' In this case, Mr. Oakley fathered nine
children (ages three, four, five, ten, twelve, twelve, thirteen, thirteen,
and sixteen) with four different women.42 Mr. Oakley was found
guilty of the Class E felony of intentionally refusing to pay child sup-
43port. Although Wisconsin law permits a judge to impose an onerous
prison sentence on nonsupport offenders, the law also allows judges,
when imposing a sentence, to take into account other factors, includ-
ing criminal record, character and personality, culpability, age, educa-
tion and employment, remorse, repentance and cooperativeness, need
for rehabilitative control, and the rights of the public. 44
If a judge chooses to place an offender on probation, he may im-
pose "any conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropri-
ate., 45 Wisconsin courts, however, have not interpreted this statute to
grant judges absolute authority: judges must "fashion the terms of
probation to meet the rehabilitative needs of the defendant" as well as
take into account the needs of society and potential victims. 46 Accord-
ingly, the trial court in Oakley determined that the defendant could
41 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001).
42 Dennis Chaptman, High Court Limits Dad's Procreation, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
July 11, 2001, at LA.
43 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201. Wisconsin has since changed the statutes at issue. Today,
the statute provides that "[a]ny person who intentionally fails for 120 or more consecutive days
to provide... child support[,] which the person knows or reasonably should know the person is
legally obligated to provide[,] is guilty of a Class I felony." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.22(2) (West
2005). Class I felonies are the lowest felony classification in Wisconsin and carry a maximum
punishment of $10,000 fine and/or three and one-half years in prison (changed from two years
at the time of this case). Id. § 939.50(3)(i).
44 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 205 (citing State v. Guzman, 480 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1992)).
45 § 973.09(1)(a).
46 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 205-06 (quoting State v. Gray, 590 N.W.2d 918 (Wis. 1999)).
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provide no help to his children in prison4' and sentenced him to a
five-year term of probation. 48 As one condition of his probation, the
judge instructed Oakley to avoid having children until he could prove
that he could support his nine children as well as an additional child.49
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court supported the antipro-
creation condition of Oakley's probation.50 The court began by em-
phasizing the importance of tailoring probation conditions to the indi-
vidual defendant. 51 Believing that conditional probation would
rehabilitate the defendant, teach him to respect the law, and protect
the needs of his children, the court rejected Oakley's argument that
the antiprocreation condition violated his fundamental right to procre-
52
ate. The court held that as a convicted felon, Oakley must relinquish
some fundamental rights, including his right to procreate, and pay-
ment of child support as well as the rehabilitation of an offender both
constitute compelling governmental interests.5 3
Furthermore, the antiprocreation condition was not limitless or
overbroad but narrowly tailored to expire either when Oakley paid his
child support or at the end of the five-year probation period, which-
ever came first.54 The court also added that if the trial judge had cho-
sen to incarcerate Oakley, he would have had no right to procreate in
prison.55
When presented with a condition of probation similar to that in the
Oakley case, Ohio courts took a different position. Ohio law grants
trial courts broad discretion in imposing probationary sanctions.
56
Specifically, for a felony offender, the "court may impose any other
conditions of release under a community control sanction that the
court considers appropriate., 57 For a misdemeanor offender, in "the
interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the
47 Id. at 203. A neighboring county had already sentenced Oakley to a three-year prison
sentence, so any sentence imposed here would be additional. Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 201.
50 Id. at 206-07.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 212.
53 Id. at 212-13.
54 Id. at 212.
55 Id. at 209 n.25.
56 State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ohio 2004). The Ohio Revised Code provides
that a trial court may impose "community sanctions" for up to five years when sentencing an
offender for a felony. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.15(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2004). These sanc-
tions can include residential sanctions, nonresidential sanctions, or financial sanctions. Id. If the
offender fulfills the condition of the community control sanction, the court can reduce the length
of the sanction. Id.
57 § 2929.15(A)(1). In Ohio, "community control is the functional equivalent of proba-
tion." Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1205.
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offender's good behavior, the court may impose additional
requirements.,
58
In State v. Tally,59 the defendant pled no contest to "unlawfully
and recklessly failing to provide adequate support for three of his
seven minor children."' 6° Mr. Talty's two counts of nonsupport
amounted to a fifth-degree felony.6' He owed nearly $38,000 in child
support.62 As part of his five-year probation sentence, the trial court
required Talty to "make all reasonable efforts to avoid conceiving
another child while under the supervision of the . . . Probation De-
partment"; the judge continued: "What those efforts are are up to him,
that is not for me to say, I am not mandating what he does, only that
he has to make reasonable efforts to do So." 6 3
The Supreme Court of Ohio vacated the antiprocreation condition
in Talty's sentence. In Ohio, any condition of probation must relate to
the three statutory goals of probation: "doing justice, rehabilitating
the offender, and insuring good behavior." 64 A probation condition is
valid in Ohio if it is "reasonably related to the statutory ends of proba-
tion and [is] not . . . overbroad. 65 The trial court believed that the
antiprocreation condition would serve to rehabilitate Talty but did not
include a means to lift the antiprocreation condition if he showed
66signs of rehabilitation. As a result, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the antiprocreation condition of probation over broadly infringed
on Talty's liberty, and the condition was not reasonable.67
The court rejected the state's argument that the order was not lim-
itless because it could have been changed if Talty exhibited signs of
68rehabilitation by making child support payments. And, the court
expressly refused to determine whether they would have upheld the
antiprocreation condition had it included a time limit.69 Thus, Ohio
law remains unresolved as to whether all antiprocreation conditions of
probation are per se invalid. As a result of Talty, in any future case,
58 § 2929.25(B)(2).
59 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004).
0 State v. Talty, No. 02-CR-0075, 2003-Ohio-3161, 2, 2003 WL 21396835, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 18, 2003), rev'd, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004).
61 Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1202. Pursuant to Ohio law, nonsupport is the failure to provide
adequate support to a minor child. § 2919.21 (A)(2).
62 Editorial, Paternity Rights: Lower Court's Order that Man Stop Fathering Kids Raises
Questions, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 20, 2004, at 14A.
63 Taly, 2003-Ohio-3161, 4.
64 Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1204 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.25(B)(2) (Lex-
isNexis 2003) (formerly § 2951.02(C)).
65 Id. at 1205.
66Id.
67 Id.
6 Id. at 1206.
69 Id. at 1205.
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the state would at least have to prove that restricting reproduction
would serve the penological goal of rehabilitation and include a rea-
sonable time limit.
These two cases illustrate that state courts are open to the idea of
antiprocreation conditions of probation; at least some judges believe
that a parent who fails to pay child support for several children after
numerous court orders may be more likely to be rehabilitated and be-
come a productive member of society if he does not father additional
children until he either pays his child support or pays his debt to soci-
ety by serving his sentence of probation.
2. Abusive Parents
There are more than three million reported cases of child abuse
each year in America and three children die each day from abuse or
neglect. 70 Abused children more often suffer from depression, alco-
holism, drug abuse, and severe obesity as well as require special edu-
cation or become involved in criminal activity. 71 The size and scope
of the child abuse problem may be a contributing factor to why
judges, especially those who hear child abuse cases daily, feel the
need to take steps that they believe would help curb the problem. One
such solution includes antiprocreation conditions of probation on
child abusing parents; this section summarizes a sampling of these
cases.
In the Oregon case State v. Kline,72 a court sentenced the defendant
to three years probation for criminally mistreating his daughter. 7 Mr.
Kline admitted to bruising the two-month-old baby's chest and back
and fracturing her leg; he also admitted to anger and frustration prob-
lems as well as drug abuse.74 Four years earlier, the defendant had
been stripped of parental rights to his two-year-old son for abusing
him in a similar manner.75 As a condition of the defendant's proba-
tion, the trial judge imposed the following condition: "You may not
without prior written approval by the Court following the successful
completion of a drug treatment program and anger management pro-
70 Suzette Fromm, Total Estimated Cost of Child Abuse and Neglect in the United States
(2001), http://www.preventchildabuse.org/leam-more/researchdocs/cost-analysis.pdf.
71 Id.
72 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
73 Id. at 698. Criminal mistreatment involves intentionally or knowingly causing physical
injury to a dependant child, to whom an individual owes a familial duty. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.205 (2003) (amended 2005).
74 Id. at 699.
75 Id.
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gram and any other program directly related to counseling related to
... your conduct towards children[,] father any child." 76
An Oregon appellate court affirmed this antiprocreation condition,
arguing that the defendant's recidivism and pattern of abuse, com-
bined with the court's fear for the safety of any child the defendant
has or would father, warranted the condition. 7 The court emphasized
that the restriction on his reproductive rights was temporary and not a
total ban.78 By requiring the defendant to undergo drug and anger
management treatment,79 the court hoped to make Klein a law abiding
and socially functioning citizen. And, based on the defendant's pat-
tern of behavior towards children, the court required him to attend
counseling related to his conduct towards children so that he could
safely interact with children in the future.80 Thus, the Oregon court
justified the restriction based on the possibility of rehabilitation and
held that it "interfere[d] with [the] defendant's fundamental rights to a
permissible degree." 81
A California court placed a similar restriction on a mother who
abused her children in People v. Pointer.82 In this case, the defendant
mother of two was devoted to a rigorous macrobiotic diet, eating
mostly grains, beans, and vegetables with no fruit, dairy, or meats.
8 3
The defendant imposed her diet on her two- and four-year-old sons
despite their doctor's insistence that it was unhealthy and particularly
"hazardous" for the youngest boy who she was breastfeeding1 4 When
she finally brought the youngest child to a pediatrician, the "child
who was emaciated, semicomatose, and in a state of shock, was dying
and in need of immediate hospitalization. 85 The defendant, however,
took the child home because she feared the hospital would feed him
preservatives that would give him a rash. 6 The doctor then called the
police who took the child to the hospital; and even then the defendant
would sneak him macrobiotic food and continued to breastfeed him.
87
Eventually, after she abducted her son from foster care and fled to
Puerto Rico, a court found her guilty of abandonment and neglect.
88
76 Id. (alterations in original).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
0 Id.
81 Id.
82 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
83 Id. at 359.
84 Id.
" Id. at 360.
6 Id.
7 Id.
88 Id. at 361. The older son was seriously underdeveloped, and the younger boy suffered
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Her sentence included five years probation during which time she was
to have no custody of any children and was not to conceive a child.89
The California appellate court recognized that trial courts have
broad statutory authority when imposing conditions of probation that
foster rehabilitation and protect the public; however, the appellate
court also acknowledged the limits on this discretion. 90 According to
California jurisprudence, any infringement on a fundamental right
must be reasonably related to a compelling state interest and not be
overbroad. 91 Because the antiprocreation condition related to the
defendant's recidivism of child endangerment and specifically
because her diet would harm even an unborn child she might
conceive, the court found the restrictions on the defendant's
procreation to be reasonable.92
However, the court found that the antiprocreation condition was
overbroad and not closely correlated to the state's interest because the
trial judge intended the condition only to protect society (via prevent-
ing injury to a child) and not to rehabilitate the defendant.93 Thus,
since the appellate court believed that other conceivable means ex-
isted to protect the defendant's potential unborn children, such as re-
quiring her to follow intensive prenatal treatment if she were to con-
ceive, it held the antiprocreation condition was too broad, did not
serve the state's interest in rehabilitation, and therefore constituted an
unconstitutional imposition on the defendant's fundamental right. 94
Consequently, it remains unclear how a California court would rule in
a case where a trial court imposed a more narrow antiprocreation
condition that served the rehabilitative goal of probation.
Florida has also faced the question of antiprocreation conditions of
probation. In Rodriguez v. State,95 the defendant entered a plea of
nolo contendere to a charge of aggravated child abuse after she
bruised her nine-year-old by hitting the child in the face and against
an automobile. 96 She received a sentence of ten years probation with a
"special condition" that she not have custody of a child or become
pregnant during that time.97 The appellate court began by stressing
that a trial court may impose any conditions of probation that are not
from "severe growth retardation and permanent neurological damage." Id. at 360.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 363.
91 Id. at 365.
92 Id. at 364.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 366.
95 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
% Id.
97 Id. at 8. It is unclear whether this was her first offense. Id.
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so punitive as to obscure the rehabilitative purpose of probation."
The court found, however, that the condition prohibiting Rodriguez
from getting pregnant during the ten-year period of her probation re-
lated to a noncriminal act that bore no relationship to the crime of
child abuse. Therefore, the antiprocreation condition did not reasona-
bly relate to future criminality in light of a probation condition for-
bidding her from having custody of a minor child. Thus, it did not
fulfill the rehabilitative purpose of probation."
To summarize: in two of the five cases above, appellate courts up-
held an antiprocreation condition of probation, Oakley, a nonsupport
case, and Klein, an abuse case; in the three other cases, Talty, a non-
support case, and Pointer and Rodriguez, both child abuse cases, ap-
pellate courts invalidated the antiprocreation condition for various
reasons. It is obvious that state courts are far from agreeing on when,
if ever, an antiprocreation condition of probation is appropriate. State
courts have also not reached a consensus on how to determine when
an antiprocreation condition would unduly restrict the liberty of a
probationer.
I. ANTIPROCREATION CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY AND
JUSTIFIABLE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES BUT
MUST BE LIMITED IN TIME
As the above case law illustrates, situations arise with egregious
facts or defendants who have a history of ignoring or consistently vio-
lating the law, leading judges to believe that sometimes it is necessary
and justifiable to restrict the reproductive rights of probationers. This
Section argues that antiprocreation conditions are justifiable under
some circumstances as a means to rehabilitate offenders and are nec-
essary to protect existing and future children of offenders. However,
antiprocreation conditions are only appropriate when they can be
lifted upon the occurrence of a defined event or at a specific time.
A. Circumstances that Justify Imposing Antiprocreation Conditions
This Section will compare the reasoning courts used to either up-
hold or invalidate antiprocreation conditions of probation in the cases
summarized above. This comparison will establish a basis for deter-
mining under what circumstances antiprocreation conditions are nec-
essary and justifiable.
98 Id. at 9.
99 Id. at 10.
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1. Encouraging Offenders to Become Responsible Members of Society
Oakley and Klein expressly provide that an antiprocreation condi-
tion can rehabilitate an offender in nonsupport and child abuse cases.
The Klein court believed the antiprocreation condition would rehabili-
tate the defendant because of his history of drug and violence prob-
lems and his pattern of abuse to his children. 1°° The Oakley court
provided much detail in explaining exactly why it believed the anti-
procreation condition is reasonably related to the state's goal of reha-
bilitation:' 01 The judge spoke in a tone of frustration when he de-
scribed the defendant's repeated refusal to pay child support despite
numerous support orders from the court and with nothing hindering
him from working.'02 The judge observed that Oakley had a blatant
disregard for the law and needed to be "rehabilitated from his percep-
tion that one may flout valid court orders and the judicial process with
impunity and suffer no real consequence." 103 Therefore, the judge
crafted a sentence that included an antiprocreation condition because
he believed it would focus specifically on the defendant's rebuff of
prior court orders while forcing him to face his child support respon-
sibility and "convince him to stop victimizing his children." 1°4 The
judge explained:
Oakley was convicted of intentionally refusing to support his
children. The condition at bar will prevent him from adding
victims if he continues to intentionally refuse to support his
children. As the State argues, the condition essentially bans
Oakley from violating the law again. Future violations of the
law would be detrimental to Oakley's rehabilitation, which
necessitates preventing him from continuing to disregard its
dictates. Accordingly, this condition is reasonably related to
his rehabilitation because it will assist Oakley in conforming
his conduct to the law.
105
100State v. Klein, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
101 State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 213 (Wis. 2001).
102 Id. at 206.
03d. at 206-07 (quoting State v. Oakley, 594 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999),
rev'd, 609 N.W.2d at 786 (Wis. 2000)).
104 Id. at 207.
1051d, at 213.
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2. Furthering the Rehabilitative Purpose of Other
Specific Conditions of Probation
In child abuse cases, as a term of probation, judges typically re-
move a child from the custody of the abuser. As a practical result of
this established condition, any children born to the offender during
the probationary period will be removed from her custody immedi-
ately. How then can an offender be rehabilitated (change her behavior
and act responsibly) if she is permitted to have children merely to
hand them over to state custody? More generally, how can the cus-
tody condition of probation operate effectively absent a concurrent
antiprocreation condition?
For example, in the Rodriguez case, the court invalidated the anti-
procreation condition of the defendant's sentence claiming that it did
not relate to child abuse because she was not permitted to have cus-
tody of a minor child anyway. So presumably, if she got pregnant and
had a child, the court would take the child away. Continually having
children and handing them over to the state does not promote respon-
sible behavior, which is the rehabilitative goal of probation. Absent
an antiprocreation condition, the custody condition less effectively
serves the intended rehabilitative end, suggesting, therefore, that a
child abuser should have to prove she can first responsibly take care
of her existing children before having more children.
In one New York case, a judge instructed a cocaine-abusing couple
not to conceive a child until they could prove that they could care for
their four babies currently in foster care. The judge observed:
It is painfully obvious that a parent who has already lost to
foster care all four of her children born over a six-year period,
with the last one having been taken from her even before she
could leave the hospital, should not get pregnant again soon, if
ever . . . . This is a practical, social, economic and moral
reality. '06
This judge saw first hand that allowing women or couples to have
babies, who they continually have to hand over to the state because of
another probation condition, does not facilitate rehabilitation or teach
probationers responsibility. Thus, the one condition, absent the other,
does not fulfill the goal in totality.
In Klein, though the court did not expressly use the word rehabili-
tate when ruling to uphold the antiprocreation condition, it did focus
1
06 Santora, supra note 1.
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on "treatment" of the defendant. 107 Because the defendant had a his-
tory of drug problems and violence toward his existing children, the
court required him to attend treatment or to otherwise become reha-
bilitated before having more children. 0 8 In other words, the court im-
plied that the antiprocreation condition augments the defendant's abil-
ity to meet the primary condition of successfully completing
treatment.
In Rodriguez, the appellate court overturned the antiprocreation
condition because the state failed to prove the condition was rehabili-
tative in light of the fact that past child abuse is not necessarily in-
dicative of future child abuse. After the antiprocreation condition was
overturned, in response to a Motion for Clarification by the defendant
concerning the child expected from her pregnancy, the court per cu-
rium explained the seemingly inconsistent sentence:
We held the condition prohibiting custody of any children by
petitioner to be a valid condition of probation and thus the
condition applies to custody of any children by petitioner, re-
gardless of when the child was or will be born. Consequently,
the prohibition applies to custody of appellant's expected
child during the term of probation.l 9
This seemingly absurd result occurs because a court cannot fulfill
one clearly rehabilitative antiprocreation condition-that of removing
an abusive mother from her children-without adding the
clarification that she cannot have legal custody of expected children
during her probation. Upholding the antiprocreation condition would
eliminate the confusion presented by the defendant in her motion for
clarification.
3. Protecting the Offender's Existing and Future Children
In specific circumstances like nonsupport and child abuse cases,
sound public interest in protecting children justifies antiprocreation
conditions. Without an antiprocreation condition, existing and future
children of probationers, as well as society, will be forced to bear the
cost of consistently irresponsible individuals. These individuals
should be rehabilitated and thereby guided to become responsible and
productive members of society rather than be allowed to produce
children who will become wards of the state or victims of poverty and
107 State v. Klein, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
108 Id.
109 Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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abuse. At the same time, if the state has no interest in protecting a
child, then a judge should not impose an antiprocreation condition.
Limitations must be in place, however to ensure that judges will
not have unfettered discretion to impose antiprocreation conditions on
offenders for crimes other than nonsupport or child abuse for several
reasons: First, an offender must have existing children that he is di-
rectly affecting with his criminal actions. In addition, there must be a
chance that the welfare or safety of future children would be directly
affected if the offender continued his conduct. Thus, although one
could argue that an offender who was guilty of petty theft, for exam-
ple, might be harming his existing children and continued violations
might continue to affect these and any future children, the effect
would be indirect rather than directly related to the physical welfare
of his children.
A comparison of Oakley and Klein to Pointer reveals the impor-
tance of the antiprocreation condition acting as a means to protect the
existing and future children of the probationer. The Oakley court de-
termined that the antiprocreation condition was narrowly tailored to
the specific crime, especially in light of the defendant's intentional
refusal to abide by the law and pay his child support. The judge ex-
pected that his probationary conditions would protect the public inter-
est by aiding the nine child victims of Oakley's continued crimes. 0
Similarly, when determining that an antiprocreation condition best
fulfilled the court's concern for the safety of any future children, the
Klein court considered the defendant's recidivism, his past failure to
comply with probation conditions, and his patterns of behavior in ad-
dition to potential alternative conditions." In this case, the antipro-
creation condition could prove to be especially important to protect
any future children conceived by the defendant in light of the fact that
the defendant only abused his own children. If the defendant con-
ceived another child prior to completing his treatment, he may ulti-
mately victimize that baby.
On the other hand, in Pointer, the court believed that the antipro-
creation condition was overbroad and therefore invalid because rea-
sonable alternatives existed to protect future children, such as prenatal
care. 112 However, judges have discretion to consider the circum-
stances and the nature of the defendant. In this case, the judge could
consider the likelihood that Ms. Pointer would refuse to submit to the
necessary prenatal care for the health of her unborn children, suggest-
10 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 206-08.
11 Klein, 963 P.2d at 699.
112 People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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ing the appropriateness of the antiprocreation condition. This Note
supports allowing judges such discretion for cases like Pointer, be-
lieving that this type of child abuser should be rehabilitated before
having additional children and perpetuating the cycle of abuse.
B. Limiting Judicial Authority to Protect a Probationer's
Fundamental Right to Procreate: The Importance of a Time Limit
The above cases illustrate how the goal of rehabilitation justifies
antiprocreation conditions of probation in certain instances. Conced-
edly, judges should not be able to impose the condition in situations
that would unduly or inappropriately limit an offender's fundamental
right to have children.
Though most legislatures grant judges a degree of freedom in im-
posing restrictions on probationers, state appellate courts have estab-
lished tests to determine whether sentencing judges have overstepped
their authority or have infringed on a probationer's constitutional
rights. The Supreme Court, however, has not established a standard
for addressing the constitutionality of probation conditions.
As the antiprocreation cases illustrate, in determining whether a
trial judge has imposed an impermissible condition of probation, most
state appellate courts employ a rule that involves determining if the
condition of probation is reasonable and relates to the statutory goal
of probation.1 3 Some states also add a requirement that the condition
not be overly broad.14
As indicated above, appellate courts confronting an antiprocreation
condition of probation have focused on time limits as a means to con-
trol overly broad restrictions on a probationer's constitutional liberty.
Comparing the condition in Oakley and Talty illustrates this issue:
Mr. Oakley's antiprocreation restriction was drafted to end either
when he paid his child support or when the five-year probation term
ended. Mr. Talty's antiprocreation condition, however, did not in-
clude a time limit and as a result restricted his right to procreate for
the entire length of his probation regardless of whether he paid his
child support or not.
The Tally appellate court expressly distinguished Talty from Oak-
ley because Talty's sentence lacked a provision to lift the antiprocrea-
tion condition after a defined period of time or at the occurrence of a
113 Williams, supra note 40, at 218; State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 1989).
114 Hughes v. State, 667 So. 2d 910, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Williams v. State, 661
So. 2d 59, 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 210 (citing Edwards v. State,
246 N.W.2d 109 (Wis. 1976)).
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specific event, such as paying off his child support debts. 515 This lack
of limitation prompted the court to invalidate the condition. Thus,
without a time limit, the antiprocreation condition amounts to an
overly broad infringement on a probationer's constitutional liberties.
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON RESTRICTING CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF PROBATIONERS AND PROCREATION RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
The tests developed by the Supreme Court and applied by the cir-
cuit courts in analogous situations reveal that antiprocreation condi-
tions of probation do not drastically expand current precedent. First,
the Supreme Court has already restricted other constitutional rights of
probationers. Second, circuit courts have used Supreme Court prece-
dent on restricting prisoners' constitutional rights to determine that
prison regulations restricting the fundamental right to procreate are
valid; such restrictions are comparable to restricting procreative rights
of offenders with a different type of sentence-probation. Thus, re-
stricting probationers' fundamental right to procreate is justifiable
because the rationale for doing so is analogous to that developed by
the Supreme Court and applied by lower courts.
A. Constitutional Rights of Probationers Are
Not Immune from Restrictions
Federal courts have upheld conditions of probation that restrict
constitutional rights including freedom of speech, association, and
religion as well as the right to counsel.1 6 In Griffin v. Wisconsin,117
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of a probationer's constitu-
tional rights in the context of the Fourth Amendment. In Griffin, pro-
bation officers conducted a warrantless search of a probationer's
home. i t8 The Supreme Court held that a warrantless search does not
violate a probationer's Fourth Amendment right because probation
"diminishes a probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy-so
that a probation officer may ... search a probationer's home without
a warrant."'"19
The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to establish a new
principle of law but ruled that because the probationer was under the
"' State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ohio 2004).
116 Evan D. Alexander, Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, Introduction and
Guide for Users: IV. Sentencing: Probation, 89 GEO. L.J. 1713, 1718-20 (2001) (citing a num-
ber of circuit court decisions upholding these conditions of probation).
117483 U.S. 868 (1987).
I181d. at 871.
"1
9Id. at 872 (agreeing with the holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court).
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control of the Department of Health and Social Services he is subject
to its rules and regulations. 120 Because the probation officers carried
out the search of the probationer's home pursuant to regulations that
do not violate the Fourth Amendment, then the search itself cannot
violate the Fourth Amendment.'
2
'
The Court emphasized that operating a probation system presents
"special needs" beyond those of normal law enforcement, thus
justifying the infringement on a constitutional right beyond what
would be constitutionally permissible if the regulation were applied to
the general public. 22 Yet, any restriction of a constitutional right on a
probationer must still fulfill the legislatively defined purposes of
probation.1
23
This case is useful to consider in an analysis of antiprocreation
conditions to the extent that it speaks to an infringement on a funda-
mental right. Although restricting procreation does not deal with the
"special needs" of running a regulatory system, rather a judge im-
poses the antiprocreation condition as part of a sentence, the Griffin
case confirms that the Supreme Court is not adverse to restricting
constitutional rights of probationers. In a particularly relevant foot-
note in the Griffin case, the majority wrote:
We have recently held that prison regulations allegedly in-
fringing constitutional rights are themselves constitutional as
long as they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." We have no occasion in this case to decide
whether, as a general matter, that test applies to probation
regulations as well.
124
Thus, the Court refused to use this case to accept a test for state in-
fringement on a probationer's constitutional rights during probation.
In a footnote responding to the majority's footnote, the dissent
recognized that there is no reason to automatically analyze probation
regulations using the same standard of review as prison regulations,
especially considering that an important reason for the standard estab-
lished for infringing on fundamental rights of prisoners is to maintain
the security and order of the prison. 25 Therefore, the dissent implied
120 Id.
121 Id. at 873.
122 Id. at 875.
123 Id. (citing Wisconsin law where probation restrictions are "meant to assure that the pro-
bation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the
probationer's being at large").
124 Id. at 874 n.2 (citation omitted).
125 Id. at 882 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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that in future cases, the Supreme Court should develop an entirely
new test for probation regulations, unrelated to the rational basis
analysis it employs for prison regulations when a state infringes on
fundamental rights because probation does not have the added goal of
maintaining order and security of a prison.
An understanding of the existing test created by the Supreme
Court for restricting fundamental rights in prison is in order before
determining whether a new test is necessary, as the dissent has
suggested, or whether the test used for prisoners will suffice for
probationers.
B. Permissible Infringement on Incarcerated
Offenders' Right to Procreate
Bell v. Wolfish 126 is the seminal case regarding prisoners' rights in
which the Court established that prisoners do not automatically forgo
their constitutional rights merely as a result of incarceration but retain
many freedoms such as speech and religion under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments respectively. 27A prison may, however, institute
reasonable regulations that restrict or limit constitutional rights of
prisoners to fulfill goals and policies of a prison institution, to main-
tain security and order within the prison, and to remedy day-to-day
problems as prison officials see fit using their "professional expertise"
with some latitude, discretion, and "wide-ranging deference" to insti-
tute policies that maintain order in the prison. 28 In other words, a
regulation may infringe on a prisoner's right if the right in question is
inherently inconsistent with incarceration. 129
In Turner v. Safley, 130 the Court ruled that any prison regulation in-
fringing on the constitutional rights of prisoners must be "reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.' 3' To determine whether a
prison regulation is reasonable, the Court developed a four factor
analysis now known as the "Turner test." First, there must be a
"'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it" 132 and the
26441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding a restriction that bans shipment of hardback books
from any source other than the publisher for security reasons).
127 1d. at 521 (noting additionally that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
guards prisoners against invidious racial discrimination; and, the Due Process Clause allows
prisoners to "claim" protection against additional deprivations of life, liberty, or property).
128Id. at 547-48.
129 Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (ruling on a prisoner's right
to procreate from prison using artificial insemination).
130482 U.S. 78 (1987).
'31Id. at 89.
132 1d. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
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regulation cannot be "arbitrary or irrational."' 133 The second factor
asks whether the inmate has alternative means of exercising his con-
stitutional right.134 The third factor determines what impact allowing
the inmate to exercise his right has on guards, other inmates, and
prison resources. 135 And finally, the regulation must be facially rea-
sonable. The absence of alternative measures is evidence of a reason-
able prison regulation whereas the existence of "ready alternatives"
that impose mere de minimus costs on the prison is evidence that the
regulation constitutes an "exaggerated response" to goals of the
prison.
136
In weighing the four factors of the Turner test, courts routinely
consider the basic penological goals of imprisonment: incapacitation,
deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.137 In Turner, the Court con-
cluded that an inmate-to-inmate correspondence prohibition was rea-
sonably related to a legitimate security interest while a marriage re-
striction was not reasonable but constituted an exaggerated response
to legitimate penological interests and security concerns. 138 The Su-
preme Court has not yet heard a case relating to a prisoner's right to
procreate. 139 However, in the landmark cases of Goodwin v. Turner'
4 °
and Gerber v. Hickman, 14 the Eighth and Ninth Circuits respectfully
'
33 Id. at 90.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137Rachel Michael Kirkley, Note, Prisoners and Procreation: What Happened Between
Goodwin and Gerber? 30 PEPP. L. REv. 93, 100 (2002) (quoting State v. Baker, 38 P.3d 614,
615 (Idaho 2001)).
138 482 U.S. at 91.
139 Kirkley, supra note 137, at 93. Because an inherent factor of imprisonment involves
isolation from society, it is not immediately apparent how prisoners can procreate. The most
obvious means of procreating would be through conjugal visits; however, prisoners have no
inherent right to conjugal visits. States generally consider conjugal visits to be a privilege that
prison officials may grant to some inmates; therefore, courts do not consider conjugal visits to
be relevant to the right to procreate. Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc). Prisons generally prohibit or strictly limit conjugal visits, citing reasons of order, disci-
pline, security, rehabilitation, and financial burdens. Kirkley, supra note 137, at 101.
In Hernandez v. Coughlin, the Second Circuit held that "[tihe Constitution ... does not
create any protected guarantee to conjugal visitation privileges while incarcerated." 18 F.3d 133,
137 (2d Cir. 1994). Every circuit agrees that there is no constitutional right to conjugal visits.
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1113 (9th Cir. 1986) (listing cases supporting the propo-
sition that there is no constitutional right to conjugal visits, for example, Feeley v. Sampson, 570
F.2d 364, 372-73 (1st Cir. 1978); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754,
758-60 (3d Cir. 1979); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975); Lynott v.
Henderson, 610 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1980); O'Bryan v. County of Saginan, 741 F.2d 283,
284-85 (6th Cir. 1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 580 n.26 (10th Cir. 1980)). Therefore,
the case law in this area deals primarily with inmates who have attempted to procreate through
assisted reproductive technologies.
1- 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
141 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002). The prior
history of Gerber is worth mentioning. In an earlier decision on this case, Gerber I, the Ninth
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have addressed the issue of a prisoner's request to artificially insemi-
nate' 42 his wife.
In Goodwin, the defendant inmate was married; he and his wife
wished to have a child through artificial insemination. Mr. Goodwin
asked prison officials to allow several doctors and a medical assistant
to come to the prison to ensure proper collection of the semen, and to
perform certain tests. 43 As prison officials refused to accommodate
Mr. Goodwin's request because the prison had no provisions in place
to carry out his request, he petitioned the court to uphold his right to
procreate.' 44 The Eighth Circuit refused, upholding the prison regula-
tion and concluding that, under Turner, the prison regulation was rea-
sonably related to a legitimate penological interest of retribution. 145
In Gerber v. Hickman,146 to facilitate artificial insemination, the
defendant wanted a laboratory to mail him a plastic collection
container as well as a return mailer to be shipped back overnight; or
in the alternative, Mr. Gerber requested that his attorney personally
return the plastic container to the laboratory. 147 Despite Gerber's offer
Circuit held that the right to procreate survives incarceration. Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882
(9th Cir. 2001). After the release of this decision, commentators jumped to explore the circuit
split between this case in the Ninth Circuit in Gerber I and the Eighth Circuit in Goodwin. E.g.,
Kirkley, supra note 137. However, the Ninth Circuit voted to vacate that opinion and rehear the
case en banc, Gerber v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001), thus producing Gerber H and
eliminating the circuit split. 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The case cited in this Note
is Gerber 11, the en banc opinion issued after the rehearing that affirms the district court holding
that the right to procreate does not survive incarceration. Id.
1
4 2 Artificial insemination has existed for nearly a century. Judith Randal, Trying To Out-
smart Infertility, 25 FDA CONSUMER 22 (1991), available at http://www.fda.govl
bbs/topics/CONSUMER/CN00012a.html The process involves collecting and treating a man's
semen and then, most commonly, placing it into the woman's uterus. Id. Though some women
have a successful pregnancy after only one procedure, often repeat inseminations over the
course of four to five months are necessary. Id. The success rate is between 50 and 65 percent.
Id.
S143Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1397. Mr. Goodwin's wife was thirty-years-old and would be
thirty-five at the latest date of his release. She would, however, be thirty-one when he would
become eligible for parole. The couple wished to use artificial insemination to conceive a child
considering the increased risks of Down's syndrome and chromosomal abnormalities possible in
a child born from a thirty-five-year-old mother. Id. The case does not provide the reason for Mr.
Goodwin's incarceration. Id.
144Id.
14 Id. at 1399. The court expressly chose not to address the question of whether the right to
procreate using artificial insemination itself actually survives incarceration. Id.
1- 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
147 1d. at 619. Because California prohibits conjugal visits to inmates serving a life sen-
tence and Mr. Gerber and his wife wished to have a child, Mr. Gerber sought to provide his wife
with a sperm specimen to use for artificial insemination. Id. The main difference between the
two cases is that, in Goodwin, the inmate's wife was thirty-years-old and would be as old as
thirty-five at the time of her husband's release, Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1396, whereas in Gerber,
the inmate's wife was forty-four-years-old and her husband was sentenced to one hundred years
to life plus eleven years, Gerber, 291 F.3d at 619. Thus, in Goodwin, the couple would still have
an opportunity to have children after the inmate's release and, in Gerber, artificial insemination
would be the couple's only means to conceive.
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to bear all expenses, the prison warden refused to accommodate his
requests. Although it ultimately reached the same conclusion as the
Eighth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit never reached a Turner analysis
because, based on Supreme Court precedent and constitutional
interpretation, it simply held "the right to procreate while in prison is
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.' ' 48
1. Restricting Procreation in Prison to Fulfill Penological Goals
In particular, the majority opinion in Gerber based its decision on
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 149 The Gerber court's find-
ing that the right to procreate is fundamentally inconsistent with in-
carceration embodies the retributive nature of the restriction.15 0 Retri-
bution has been a widely regarded theory of punishment since the
1970s;' 51 it is also known as "just desserts" for wrongful conduct.1
52
This theory is based on the idea that it is "fitting" and "just" that an
individual who has harmed society should suffer harm himself. 1
53
Retribution does not deal with preventing or maintaining social order
or gaining revenge but instead focuses on punishing those who de-
serve it based on the view of a majority of citizens.1 54
The Gerber court's explanation of "technology" reveals the re-
tributive nature of the holding: if "science progressed to the point
where [an inmate] could artificially inseminate his wife as easily as
write her a letter ... [our analysis] would not [change]. ' 55 Such ad-
vances in technology would likely allow a prisoner to procreate under
the Turner test because the mail would provide an alternative means
of exercising a constitutional right that would have little or no impact
on the guards, inmates, or prison resources. 156 The court avoided the
Turner test and instead focused on the isolation of prisoners and the
removal of certain rights as a matter of deterrence and retribution.1
57
The dissenting judges openly criticized the majority's retributive
motives and pointed out that Gerber was not asking to rear a child or
supersede normal prison security, he merely wanted to mail his semen
148 Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623.
149 Id. at 622.
150 Id. at 620.
151 COHEN, supra note 14, § 1:6.
152 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a)(6) (4th ed. 2003) (quoting other secondary
sources).
153 Id.
5 Michael S. Moore, A Taxonomy of Purposes of Punishment, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 64,66 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999).
155 Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622.
156 Id. at 629-30 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
'
57Id. at 622 (majority opinion).
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to his wife. 58 Thus, viewing this issue in a narrower sense, the dissent
argued that retribution wrongly remains the sole reason to support the
prevention of procreation in prison. 159 If the purpose of prohibiting
procreation is to punish offenders, then, according to the dissent, the
legislature should make such a decision. 6°
Finally, the Gerber court believed that restricting procreation
serves to rehabilitate the offender. The court explained that "by quar-
antining criminal offenders for a given period of time... the rehabili-
tative processes of the corrections system work to correct the of-
fender's demonstrated criminal proclivity." 161 The theory of
rehabilitation stems from the idea that there are underlying causes for
a criminal's behavior, and an offender's behavior can be altered by
identifying and changing these underlying causes; through treatment,
an offender can be reformed and returned to society without the desire
to commit additional crimes. 162
2. Restricting Procreation to Maintain Security and Order in Prisons
Courts have historically taken a "hands-off approach" to prison
regulations because of the difficulty of effective prison administra-
tion, the nature of problems in prisons, and the inefficiency of judicial
intervention. 63 Courts have found that "the problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are
not readily susceptible to resolution by decree . . . courts are ill
equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison ad-
ministration and reform" that are primarily the responsibility of the
legislature. 64 At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that courts have a duty to protect the fundamental rights of
prisoners.'65
159 1d. at 629-30 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
l 9 Id. at 626 (Tashima J., dissenting).
160Id.
161 id. at 621 (majority opinion) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974)).
162 LAFAVE, supra note 152, § 1.5(a)(3). The Gerber court's analysis is questionable con-
sidering that the American Bar Association has likened prison gates to a "revolving door rather
than a barrier to crime" and observed that "it is almost a guarantee that the defendant will
emerge a more dangerous man than when he entered." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 9.
163 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) (challenging mail censorship regula-
tions and the ban prohibiting law students and paralegals from conducting attorney-client inter-
views of inmates).
1 Id. at 404-05.
165Id. at 405-06. "But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a
prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will
discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights." Id. (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969)).
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In addition to justifying the procreation restriction using penologi-
cal theories, according to the Gerber court, institutional needs of the
prison warranted such a restriction. Yet, the court all but wrote out
this justification for a prison restriction on procreation by asserting
that if reproducing were as easy as mailing a letter, an act not prohib-
ited by prisons, the ruling to support the regulation would not change.
The Goodwin opinion included a statement by the Bureau of Pris-
ons explaining the problems with allowing the defendant to facilitate
the artificial insemination of his wife. 16 6 The Bureau believed that if
artificial insemination were allowed in one case, all of the Bureau's
institutions would be forced to develop procedures to facilitate artifi-
cial insemination and this would either drain resources or create secu-
rity risks "especially in connection with inmates with a high security
classification."'
167
The previous section showed that federal courts will support a pro-
creation restriction for an offender (in prison) if it fulfills the theories
of punishment and if it also serves some practical policy goal based
on the offender's situation (i.e., as an inmate). Therefore, states
should and can impose procreation restrictions on probationers with-
out violating the Constitution if the restriction is justifiable for analo-
gous reasons.
As the discussions in the Griffin footnotes suggest, one cannot as-
sume that the test for restricting a constitutional right during prison
automatically applies to restricting that same right during probation.
If the policy ends are analogous, however, then the means to achieve
those ends can be analogous. In the case of prisoners, the ends are to
fulfill the theories of punishment and to enforce a policy of maintain-
ing security and order in the prison. For probation, the ends are to
fulfill the theories of punishment and to further a policy of protecting
children. Therefore, because the ends are analogous, to achieve those
ends states should be able to impose analogous means-restricting
procreation.
V. A NEW TEST FOR RESTRICTING PROCREATION OF PROBATIONERS
This Note has shown through existing case law that there are spe-
cific times and circumstances that justify and necessitate restricting
166 Promoting fairness between male and female inmates was the primary justification that
the Eighth Circuit used in Goodwin to support its decision to uphold the antiprocreation restric-
tion at issue. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1400 (8th Cir. 1990). The court found that the
Bureau of Prisons had a legitimate interest in treating all prisoners, both male and female,
equally. Id. Permitting female inmates to procreate would create a significant financial burden in
both medical and child care costs. Id.
167 d. at 1397-98.
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procreation of certain offenders. In addition, this Note has shown that
procreation restrictions are an acceptable means of achieving certain
policy goals: to fulfill the penological goal of rehabilitation and to
implement the additional practical policy goal of protecting existing
and future children of an offender.
Based on the test used by federal courts to restrict procreation in
prison combined with existing tests states use to determine when sen-
tencing judges overstep their authority, this Note proposes that trial
courts use an ad hoc balancing test to determine when and whether to
impose an antiprocreation condition of probation because it is sup-
ported by public policies and it is not overly restrictive on the funda-
mental rights of the probationer.
First, the antiprocreation condition shall not be arbitrary or irra-
tional but shall be reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the pro-
bationer either by encouraging the probationer to be a more responsi-
ble and functioning member of society or by facilitating the
probationer's ability to meet or not frustrate other clearly rehabilita-
tive conditions of probation.
Second, the antiprocreation condition must directly relate to the
protection of the probationer's existing and future children, taking
into account the probationer's history and character. Although there
may be other less restrictive means of achieving the same end, a judge
may choose to favor the antiprocreation condition if it is most likely
to succeed in protecting existing and future children in light of the
probationer's particular circumstances.
Third, the antiprocreation condition shall contain a time limit in
the form of a provision that the condition can be lifted if the proba-
tioner meets certain other conditions of his probation or remedies
specific behavior as the court in its discretion would require.
This test not only meets the judicial limitations set by courts, but it
still allows judges the discretion granted to them by legislatures in
probation statutes whereby they can impose conditions tailored to the
probationer and his or her rehabilitative needs. This test also allows
judges to impose antiprocreation conditions of probation when and
only in those cases where they are justifiable and necessary according
to existing precedent. Applying this test to the facts of Talty, Pointer,
Oakley, Rodriguez, and Klein could all support imposing an antipro-
creation condition (as long as the judge included a time restriction).
One commentator views Klein and Oakley as exceptions to what
could be considered a "hard, fast, longstanding rule" that antiprocrea-
tion conditions of probation fail and nothing seems to make the out-
comes predictable, not the tests applied or the egregiousness of the
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facts. 168 The balancing test proposed above aims to do just that-
create a means of predictably imposing antiprocreation conditions.
This Note does not argue that all child abuser and nonsupport
offenders on probation need antiprocreation conditions-far from it.
This Note pointedly argues that certain situations are so egregious
that public policy supports antiprocreation conditions when the state
can prove and the judge believes that the condition will aid in the
offender's rehabilitation, will protect the existing and future children
of an offender, and will be imposed only for a finite or defined period.
Such an ad hoc balancing test is a means by which judges can
determine when an antiprocreation condition is both justified and
necessary.
VI. PRACTICAL OBSTACLES AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE
OF ANTIPROCREATION CONDITIONS: THE COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. Enforcement Problems
As this Note describes, the probation system is founded on the
principle that certain types of offenders may become productive
members of society if they can be rehabilitated and reintegrated into
society by adhering to conditions of behavior set by a court. En-
forcement of probation conditions is a key element in serving both
deterrent and rehabilitative purposes. The deterrent factor operates
when an offender obeys a condition because of the threat of incarcera-
tion upon violation of the condition. 169 On the other hand, the reha-
bilitative purpose of probation involves actions taken to help the of-
fender become productive and responsible or to treat him for specific
problems, such as requiring employment or an anger management
program.
Critics of antiprocreation conditions cite the difficulty of enforce-
ment to emphasize what they believe is the preposterousness of the
condition. For example, in State v. Talty, Justice Evelyn Lundberg
Stratton of Ohio asked from the bench: "How in the world would a
judge enforce this?"' 70 Critics might argue that if judges routinely
impose conditions on probation that are unenforceable, the institution
of probation could be seriously undermined. Others could argue that
enforcing an antiprocreation condition could be so costly that it would
leave little resources to enforce other probation conditions.
168 Jennifer Levi, Probation Restrictions Impacting the Right To Procreate: The Oakley
Error, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 81,101 (2004).
169 See COHEN, supra note 14, § 1:7.
170 Editorial, supra note 62, at 14A.
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Many conditions on probation suffer enforcement problems, how-
ever, because a probation officer cannot know the location and ac-
tions of every probationer at every moment. For example, a condition
that restricts a probationer from entering certain neighborhoods or
associating with certain individuals might prove equally as difficult
for a probation officer to monitor as an antiprocreation condition.
States rely on the fact that at least some probationers will obey the
conditions because they are deterred by knowing that they will be
incarcerated if the state discovers a violation.
B. Gender Equality
Some commentators believe forced birth control has a dispropor-
tionate impact on minorities and women.1 71 Even in cases involving
an antiprocreation condition on male probationers, these commenta-
tors explain that the ultimate onus still rests on the woman.172 One
dissenting judge in Oakley recognized the fact that "the risk of im-
prisonment creates a strong incentive for a man in Oakley's position
to demand from the woman the termination of her pregnancy. It
places the woman in an untenable position: have an abortion or be
responsible for Oakley going to prison for eight years." 173 Also con-
sidering Oakley, one commentator illustrates the irony involved in the
case: whereas women are generally victims of a failure to pay child
support, they will also be victims should they become pregnant and
have to make this choice.
174
This Note is sympathetic to the concerns of these commentators
and does not aim to promote a policy that disproportionately impacts
women and minorities. It does not support a general condition of
forced birth control in all child abuse and nonsupport cases. Instead,
this Note supports antiprocreation conditions only in certain types of
cases that meet specific criteria subject to an ad hoc balancing deter-
mination by the sentencing judge.
However, it is the reality of any procreation restriction that women
will be impacted differently and potentially disproportionately. 175 The
question of fairness to women was also an issue in antiprocreation
171 E.g., Janet F. Ginzberg, Compulsory Contraception as a Condition of Probation: The
Use and Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 979, 983 (1992) (discussing implications of
government distribution of Norplant).
172 E.g., Roth, supra note 8, at 411 (discussing State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis.
2001)).
173 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
174 See Roth, supra note 8, at 412-13 (exploring how reproductive policies, including anti-
procreation conditions, burden women).
17' Equal protection issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
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restrictions in prison. The Goodwin court expressly refused to review
the issue under strict scrutiny, despite the fact that the prison regula-
tion affects Goodwin's wife's fundamental right to procreate.'76
Thus, both enforcement issues and gender inequalities exist in
other situations, either during probation or in prison, and do not out-
weigh a state's interest in enforcing policies in those situations.
Therefore, these same arguments alone should not and cannot defeat
the interests in imposing antiprocreation conditions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Policies or laws that infringe on fundamental rights constitute no
trivial matter and require serious deliberation. This Note has shown
that restricting fundamental rights of criminals is not a new concept.
This Note has also shown that federal courts of appeals have already
restricted procreative rights of incarcerated offenders according to
Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, restricting the reproductive
rights of offenders who have committed certain crimes such as child
abuse or nonsupport and are sentenced to probation is not a radical
extension of either existing policy or law and in specific situations is
necessary and justifiable as a matter of reality.
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176 Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1399 (8th Cir. 1990).
t J.D. and M.B.A. candidate 2006, Case Western Reserve University School of Law and
Case Weatherhead School of Management. I would like to thank Professors Dale Nance and
Kevin McMunigal for their assistance with this Note. In addition, I extend my sincerest appre-
ciation to the members of Law Review for their support and dedication. Finally, to my parents: I
am forever ineffably grateful.
20051

